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Abstract
Free markets are, according to neoclassical economic theory, the most
efficient way of organizing human activity. The claim is that individu-
als can benefit society by acting only in their self interest. In contrast,
the evolutionary theory of multilevel selection proposes that groups must
suppress the self interest of individuals. They often do so, the evidence
suggests, by using hierarchical organization. To test these conflicting the-
ories, I investigate how the ‘degree of hierarchy’ in societies changes with
industrial development. I find that as energy use increases, governments
tend to get larger and the relative number of managers tends to grow.
Using a numerical model, I infer from this evidence that societies tend to
become more hierarchical as energy use grows. This result is inconsistent
with the neoclassical theory that individual self-interest is what benefits
society. But it is consistent with the theory of multilevel selection, in
which groups suppress the self-interest of their members.
Keywords: hierarchy; free market; economic development; sociality; cultural
evolution; multilevel selection; energy
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1 Free-market theory in an evolutionary context
There is perhaps nothing more central to mainstream economics than the
belief in free markets. The idea is seductively simple. Guided only by
self-interest, individuals can act through the market to benefit the whole
of society. This notion of the ‘invisible hand’ [1] has become founda-
tional to neoclassical economics. The theory proposes that in a perfectly
competitive market, the autonomous actions of selfish individuals will
lead to an outcome that is ‘Pareto optimum’ [2]. In this situation, no
person can be made better off without making at least one person worse
off.
This theory of free markets is not without critics. Heterodox political
economists have pointed out many flaws in neoclassical theory, mostly
related to its unrealistic assumptions [3–13]. My goal here, however, is
not to revisit this debate, but instead to broaden it. The theory of free
markets is, at its core, a theory of how human groups can organize. It
postulates that groups can organize effectively using decentralized com-
petition, and that the selfish actions of individuals can benefit the group.
The problem with this theory is that it contradicts, in almost every detail,
the modern evolutionary understanding of how social organisms function.
According to the theory of multilevel selection, social organisms face
a fundamental dilemma. Actions that are best for the group rarely maxi-
mize relative fitness within the group [14–18]. This creates a tension be-
tween the self-interest of individuals and the interest of the group. To re-
solve this tension, social organisms find ways to suppress the self-interest
of individuals. How they do so is an open-ended question. But the history
of social evolution reveals a common trend. As groups become larger and
more complex, they tend to become more hierarchical (Sec. 2).
In this evolutionary context, the theory of free markets is an outlier.
It posits that, contrary to what is observed across other social organisms,
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humans need not suppress self-interest to organize in large groups. And
we need not use hierarchical organization. We can build complex soci-
eties, the theory claims, using decentralized competition.
My goal here is to test this claim. I look for evidence that human
societies remain decentralized (or perhaps become more decentralized)
as they industrialize. I find little evidence that this is true. Instead, the
evidence suggests that to industrialize, human societies turn to hierarchi-
cal organization. I find that as energy use increases, governments tend
to get larger and the relative number of managers grows (Sec. 3). Using
a model, I infer from this data that the ‘degree of hierarchy’ in human
societies tends to increase with energy use (Sec 4 and 5).
This evidence suggests that human societies do not use atomistic
competition to develop. In this regard, free-market theory appears to
be incorrect. Paradoxically, however, I find that at the same time that
hierarchy seems to have grown, free-market theory became increasingly
popular. Looking at the United States, I find that as my measures of hier-
archy increased, so did the word frequency of free-market jargon (Sec. 6).
To make sense of this paradox, I speculate that free-market theory may
actually aid the growth of hierarchy. It does so, I propose, by serving as
a belief system that legitimizes superior-subordinate relations.
To summarize, the available evidence suggests that as human so-
cieties industrialize, they turn increasingly to hierarchical organization.
This is consistent with the theory of multilevel selection, but inconsistent
with the neoclassical theory of free markets.
2 Hierarchy
My entry point to studying free markets is to look at their opposite —
namely hierarchy. Whereas free markets are about autonomy, hierarchy
is about the loss of autonomy and the centralization of control. While I
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am ultimately interested in hierarchy in human societies, I will begin by
discussing hierarchy in the broader context of life on earth.
Hierarchical structure is ubiquitous in the natural world — so much
so that the social scientist Herbert Simon proposed that hierarchy is the
‘architecture’ of complexity’ [19]. The idea is that complex systems
are built by merging simpler components, creating a hierarchy of sub-
systems. Along with this hierarchy of structure, Simon argued, comes
a hierarchy of control. Complex biological systems are generally not
composed of autonomous subcomponents. Instead, as complexity grows,
subcomponents surrender autonomy to a centralized system of command
and control.
The evolution of life on Earth supports this idea that hierarchy is the
‘architecture’ of complexity. Through a series of ‘major evolutionary
transitions’, life has grown more complex [20]. Although different in
form, each transition appears to obey the same principle: more complex
structure grows from the merger of simpler sub-units.
Life began, we presume, when organic molecules assembled into
larger entities. The basic structure that emerged — and remains to this
day — is that of the cell. In the next major transition, eukaryotic cells
evolved (we believe) from the merger of two prokaryotic cells — a bac-
terium and an archaeon [21–24]. The bacterium became the mitochon-
dria of modern eukaryotes, while the archaeon became the cytoplasm
and nucleus. In the next transition, eukaryotic cells evolved into multi-
cellular organisms — a symbiosis that seems to have happened multiple
times [25]. In the last major transition, solitary organisms evolved into
‘eusocial’ species that cooperate in large groups [26–28]. With their large
colonies and intricate caste structure, the social instincts (ants, bees, ter-
mites) are the most conspicuous example of this eusociality. Modern hu-
mans, some scientists believe, may be the latest addition to the eusocial
club [29–32].
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Looking at these major transitions, we see that they obey the two
principles of hierarchy. First, more complex structure is built from sim-
pler components. Second, the growth of complexity seems to involve the
centralization of control. Let us begin with the nesting aspect of hier-
archy, which we see everywhere in life. Eukaryotic cells, for instance,
are built from simpler organelles (i.e. the nucleus and mitochondraia).
Multicellular organisms, in turn, are built from simpler cells. And eu-
social colonies are built from individual organisms. Each new layer of
complexity, it seems, is assembled by merging simpler components.
This nested hierarchy, Herbert Simon proposes, occurs through a pro-
cess of evolutionary problem solving [19]. Structures evolve that solve
specific problems. The cell, for instance, solves the problem of separating
‘living’ matter from ‘non-living’ matter. Once this problem is solved, the
newly created structure serves as the building block to solve new prob-
lems. Eukaryotic cells, for instance, built on the structure of prokaryotes
to solve a new problem — one of energetics. When bacterium evolved
into eukaryotic mitochondria, they shed most of their DNA, freeing up
more energy for protein synthesis [33,34]. This free energy, in turn, may
be what allowed eukaryotes to grow more complex than their prokaryotic
counterparts [35, 36].
In addition to hierarchy in the ‘nesting’ sense, the evolution of life
also follows the principle of hierarchy in the sense of centralized con-
trol. Large, complex organisms are not composed of autonomous units.
Instead, the growth of complexity seems to involve the gradual loss of
autonomy among sub-units, and the growth of centralized control. The
eukaryotic cell, for instance, is not composed of autonomous organelles.
Instead, sub-units are governed by a ‘command and control center’ —
the nucleus [37]. Similarly, multicellular animals have evolved central-
ized control in the form of the nervous system [38]. Eusocial insects
have elaborate caste systems in which most individuals surrender their
reproductive capacity to a single queen [39, 40]. Humans (who are pos-
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sibly the latest eusocial species) also organize using hierarchy. Evidence
suggests that as societies become more populous, they add new layers of
administrative hierarchy [41, 42].
The use of centralized control may arise for two (related) reasons.
First, assembling a larger system from many smaller components requires
coordination. Although decentralized coordination may be possible, it
seems that coordination within and among living things usually involves
at least some degree of centralization. Related to this problem of coordi-
nation is the suppression of self-interest. Major transitions in evolution
have all involved the merger of previously autonomous units. According
to the theory of multilevel selection, this merger is not possible unless the
self-interest of sub-units is suppressed [43–45].
Multilevel selection theory proposes that there is almost always a
conflict between the interests of the group versus the interests of indi-
viduals within the group [14–18]. For the group’s sake, it is best if indi-
viduals act altruistically. (Note that altruism is defined in terms of action
— sacrificing fitness for the benefit of the group — not in terms of in-
tent [14, 46].) But for individuals within the group, acting selfishly is ad-
vantageous. David Sloan Wilson and E.O. Wilson summarize this tension
in the following dictum: “Selfishness beats altruism within groups. Al-
truistic groups beat selfish groups. Everything else is commentary.” [17].
For groups to succeed, multilevel selection theory proposes that they must
suppress the selfishness of their sub-components — whether these are
molecules, organelles, cells or individuals.
Hierarchy may be a general solution to this problem of suppressing
selfishness. By surrendering autonomy to a system of centralized con-
trol, the components of a hierarchical system are no longer free to pursue
their own self-interest. Instead, they must do what they are ‘told’. In
some groups, this control is nearly absolute. In multicellular animals, for
instance, muscle cells are almost completely under the control of the cen-
tral nervous system. In other groups, such as the social insects, control
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is not nearly so centralized. In general, the degree of centralized con-
trol seems to relate to the cohesiveness of the group. Groups that are
highly cohesive (like multicellular organisms) have a high degree of cen-
tralization. Groups that are less cohesive (like social animals) have less
centralization. So if we were to posit a general rule, it would be this: the
more cohesive the group, the more hierarchical it is.
2.1 A clash of theories
The major transitions in evolution suggest that hierarchy is an important
tool for organizing complex groups. Interpreted using multilevel selec-
tion theory, hierarchy is a tool for suppressing the self-interest of group
members. If the principles of multilevel selection are correct, then a simi-
lar trend should hold among humans. As societies become more complex,
they should become more hierarchical.
This prediction stands in marked contrast to the one made by neo-
classical economic theory. According to neoclassical theory, humans can
organize effectively without any form of centralized control. All that is
needed is a decentralized market. To arrive at this conclusion, neoclas-
sical theory turns the postulates of multilevel selection theory on their
head. Multilevel selection theory proposes that successful groups must
suppress the self-interest of individuals. Mainstream economic theory, in
contrast, argues that groups can organize by stoking self-interest. If each
person acts in their own self-interest, the thinking goes, they will be led
‘as if by an invisible hand’ to benefit the whole society.
First proposed by Adam Smith [1], this appeal to decentralized orga-
nization is now a central tenet of mainstream economics. It is called the
‘first fundamental theorem of welfare economics’. This theorem states
that under conditions of perfect competition (meaning all firms are ‘price
takers’), markets will allocate resources in a way that is ‘Pareto effi-
cient’ [2]. This means it is impossible to make any individual better off
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without making at least one individual worse off.
There is a fundamental clash, then, between the theory of multilevel
selection and the economic theory of free markets. Multilevel selection
theory proposes that successful groups must suppress the self-interest of
individuals, and often use hierarchy to do it. In contrast, neoclassical
theory proposes that successful groups must stoke individual self-interest
using decentralized organization. If neoclassical economic theory is cor-
rect, then hierarchy should play no role in economic development. But
if multilevel selection theory is correct — and humans follow the same
pattern seen across other species — then human societies will become
more hierarchical as they grow more complex.
3 Evidence for the growth of hierarchy
To shed light on the debate between economic and evolutionary theory,
I attempt to measure the growth (or lack thereof) of hierarchy with eco-
nomic development.
To measure economic development, I use energy use per person. I
choose not to use the more common measure of development — real
GDP — for two reasons. First, there are many ‘aggregation problems’
inherent in the calculation of real GDP [47, 48]. These problems occur
largely (but not exclusively) because real GDP is based on the unit of
prices, which are unstable. This instability introduces ambiguity in the
value of real GDP. Second, I use energy rather than real GDP because
the latter has no corollary in natural systems. Energy, in contrast, is a
‘universal currency’ in the natural sciences [49]. The flow of energy is
what makes physical systems depart from equilibrium [50]. It is what
makes life possible [51, 52]. The flow of energy (per unit of mass) may
even be an indicator of complexity [53]. For these reasons, I use the
flow of energy as a measure of economic scale, and possibly of economic
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complexity.
To measure social hierarchy, I use an indirect approach. I choose
measures that are conceivably (but not directly) related to hierarchy. I
then use a model to infer from these measures the growth of hierarchy. I
use this indirect approach because the direct data on organizational hier-
archy is too sparse to draw conclusions about historical and geographic
trends. To date, only a handful of studies exist that quantify hierarchy
within business firms. (For case studies, see [54–60]. For aggregate
studies, see [61–69].) While useful for studying hierarchy at a point in
time [70, 71], these studies are too sparse to infer general trends. For
this reason, I study trends in hierarchy indirectly. To infer the extent of
social hierarchy, I use two proxies: (1) the relative size of government;
and (2) the relative number of managers. I will first discuss the trends in
these proxies, and then show (in Sec. 4 and 5) how these trends relate to
hierarchy.
Figures 1–4 show how the size of government and the management
share of employment vary with energy use per person. Each figure plots
international data ranging over roughly the last 3 decades. Lines indicate
the path through time of individual countries. Select countries are la-
beled with three-digit codes. (See iban.com/country-codes for code defi-
nitions.) For data sources and methods, see Section 8.
I will begin by looking at how government size changes with energy
use. I measure government size in terms of its share of total employment.
I define ‘government’ as the entire public sector, including state-owned
firms. Figure 1 shows the international trend between government size
and energy use. As energy use per capita increases, governments tend to
get larger.
Energy use is not, however, the only factor that affects government
size. Politics are also important. To investigate the role of politics, Figure
2 replots the data shown in Figure 1. This time, however, I differentiate
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Figure 1: Government’s share of employment vs. energy use per
capita
This figure plots international data relating the government share of employment
to energy use per capita. Lines represent the path through time of individual
countries. Points represent countries with a single observation. Select countries
are labeled with alpha-3 codes. For data sources, see Section 8.
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between two types of countries: (1) those that have (or once had) com-
munist governments; and (2) countries that have never had a communist
government. It is easy to see the difference between the two types of
countries. Those that have had communist regimes tend to have larger
governments than those that have not.
On a historical note, the data in Figure 2 captures the collapse of
the Soviet Union in action. The data begins in 1990, just when the So-
viet Union disbanded. Former Soviet states like the Ukraine, Estonia,
Moldova and Armenia begin (in 1990) with almost 100% government
employment — a relic of their communist history. But over the next
decade, governments in these countries shrank drastically, collapsing to
levels similar to their non-communist counterparts. With this government
collapse came a decline in energy use.
Given the intense battle, in the 20th century, between capitalism and
communism, it is unsurprising that politics affect the size of government.
What is surprising, however, is that regardless of politics, governments
tend to get larger as energy use increases. The inset panel in Figure
2 shows this trend. Here I smooth the raw data (within each type of
country) using a local polynomial regression. The results are interesting.
In both communist and non-communist countries, governments tend to
grow larger with energy use. Note that the trend is non-linear. Govern-
ment grows rapidly with initial development before eventually plateau-
ing. I discuss the significance of this non-linear trend in Sections 4 and
5.
Larger government is not the only organizational change that comes
with greater energy use. The relative number of managers seems to in-
crease as well. Figure 3 shows the international trend. Here I measure the
number of managers as a share of total employment, plotting this share
against energy use per capita. As with the size of government, the relative
number of managers grows with energy use. And it does so non-linearly.
The size of the management class grows rapidly during initial stages of
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Figure 2: Government’s share of employment vs. energy use per
capita by political spectrum
This figure reproduces the data in Fig. 1, but distinguishes between communist
and non-communist countries. ‘Communist countries’ are those that have (or
have once had) a communist regime. Lines represent the path through time
of individual countries. Communist countries are labeled with alpha-3 codes.
The inset panel shows the smoothed trends, calculated with a local polynomial
regression. For data sources, see Section 8.
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development, before eventually plateauing.
Unlike government size, however, the management share of employ-
ment appears to be unrelated to politics. To show this non-relation, Figure
4 replots the data from Figure 3, but this time differentiates between po-
litical regimes. Unlike with government size, communist/non-communist
politics appear not to affect the number of managers. The inset panel in
Figure 4 emphasizes this non-distinction. Here I show the smoothed trend
within each type of country, calculated using a local polynomial regres-
sion. The trend within communist (and formerly communist) countries is
virtually identical to the trend within non-communist countries.
What is clear from this evidence is that governments, as well as the
management class, tend to grow as energy use increases. What does this
tell us about the growth (or lack thereof) of hierarchy. It hints, I argue,
that hierarchy increases with economic development. Governments are
hierarchical institutions whose purpose is, in large part, to command and
control. And the job of managers is to coordinate the activities of other
people. This is an act not of autonomy, but of centralized control. So
in an intuitive sense, the evidence suggests that hierarchy grows with en-
ergy use. To make this intuition more rigorous, I will show that a simple
model of hierarchy predicts the trends in government and management-
class size.
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Figure 3: Managers’ share of employment vs. energy use per capita
This figure plots international data relating the managers’ share of total em-
ployment to energy use per capita. Lines represent the path through time of
individual countries. Select countries are labeled with alpha-3 codes. For data
sources, see Section 8.
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Figure 4: Managers’ share of employment vs. energy use per capita
by political spectrum
This figure reproduces the data in Fig. 3, but distinguishes between communist
and non-communist countries. ‘Communist countries’ are those that have (or
have once had) a communist regime. Lines represent the path through time
of individual countries. Communist countries are labeled with alpha-3 codes.
The inset panel shows the smoothed trends, calculated with a local polynomial
regression. For data sources, see Section 8.
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4 A model of energy and hierarchy
To interpret the trends in government size and management employment,
I develop a model of how hierarchical organization changes with energy
use. The model is based on the observation that as energy use increases,
institutions tend to become larger [72]. Figure 5 shows this trend for
business firms, plotting average firm size by country against energy use
per person.
As energy use increases, the average firm size tends to grow. But
rather than being caused by all firms growing slightly larger, the growth
of average firm size is caused by large firms grow larger still. As energy
use increases, the tail of the size distribution of firms gets fatter. The inset
panel in Figure 5 shows this trend. Here I group countries of the world
by energy-use quartile, and then plot (on a log-log scale) the aggregate
size distribution of firms within each quartile. As energy use increases,
the slope of the distribution grows shallower, indicating a fatter tail.
This change is relatively simple to model. As an approximation, the
size distribution of firms follows a power law [73, 74]. This means that
the probability of finding a firm with N members is roughly:
p(N) ∝
1
Nα
(1)
This power-law behavior is evident in the inset panel in Figure 5.
When plotted on a log-log scale, the size distribution of firms appears
roughly as a straight line — a characteristic feature of power laws [75,76].
As energy use increases, the power-law exponent (α) decreases. Table 1
summarizes this trend.
As a first approximation, it seems we can use a single parameter —
the power-law exponent α — to model how institution size changes with
energy use. Here I model the size distribution of institutions with a dis-
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Figure 5: How firm size changes with energy use
This figure compares the average size of firms (within countries) to energy use
per capita. Countries are labeled with alpha-3 codes. Color indicates the energy
quartile of each country (its rank, by energy use, in a four-class quantile). The
black line shows a log-log regression, with the associated 95% confidence inter-
val. The inset panel shows the associated firm-size distributions. Within each
energy quartile, I plot (on a log-log scale) the aggregate size distribution of firms
(i.e. the size distribution across all countries in the quartile). For sources and
methods, see Section 8.
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Table 1: Firm-size statistics by energy-use quartile
Energy
quartile
Average
energy use
per capita
(GJ)
Average firm
size
Power-law
exponent of
firm size
distribution
Q1 27.9 2.6 2.09
Q2 63.8 4.7 1.94
Q3 121.8 7.5 1.85
Q4 257.4 9.5 1.74
Notes: Statistics are for groups of countries ranked by energy-use quartile (see Fig. 5).
Average energy use is calculated as the unweighted mean of per capita energy use
within each energy quartile. Firm-size statistics are calculated on the aggregate firm size
distribution within each energy quartile. For sources and methods, see Section 8.
crete power law. To simulate changing energy use, I allow the exponent
α to vary between model iterations. In each iteration, I model energy use
per capita (Epc) as a function of average firm size N:
Epc = a ·
(
N
)b (2)
I determine the parameters a and b by regressing Eq. 2 onto the interna-
tional data shown in Figure 5.
4.1 Modeling hierarchy
To simulate the hierarchical structure of institutions, I use a model devel-
oped independently by Herbert Simon [77] and Harold Lydall [78]. In
this model, hierarchies have a nested structure defined by the ‘span of
control’ — the number of subordinates controlled by each superior. We
assume that this span is fixed (within and across hierarchies), meaning
each superior controls the same number of subordinates. The size of the
span of control determines the shape of the corresponding hierarchy (Fig.
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Figure 6: How the span of control determines hierarchy ‘shape’
6). A large span of control creates a hierarchy that is ‘flat’. A small span
of control creates a hierarchy that is ‘steep’.
I model the hierarchical structure of institutions using three equa-
tions. (For a derivation of these equations, see Section 8.) Given the span
of control (s) and the total membership in the institution (NT ), the number
of ranks (n) in the hierarchy is:
n =
⌊
log [1+NT (s−1)]
log(s)
⌋
(3)
Here bc denotes rounding down to the nearest integer. The number of
people in the bottom hierarchical rank is:
N1 = NT
(
1−1/s
1−1/sn
)
(4)
The size of each hierarchical rank h (where increasing h denotes moving
up the hierarchy) is then a function of the span of control:
Nh =
⌊
N1
sh−1
⌋
(5)
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Figure 7: Modeling managers in a hierarchy
I model ‘managers’ as everyone in hierarchical rank 3 and up.
The size NT of each institution is taken from the randomly generated
power-law distribution. The span of control s is a free parameter that
varies between model iterations.
4.2 Modeling managers
Within hierarchies, people who occupy top ranks tend to be managers.
Conversely, people who occupy bottom ranks tend to be non-managers.
For modeling purposes, I assume that there is a rank threshold that di-
vides managers from non-managers. I assume that everyone in and above
hierarchical rank 3 is a ‘manager’. Everyone below this rank is a ‘non-
manager’. The idea is that people in the bottom rank are ‘shop floor’
workers. People in the second rank are ‘working supervisors’ [79]. Ev-
eryone else is a professional manager. Figure 7 illustrates this model.
Given this assumption, the relative number of managers in an insti-
tution depends on two factors: (1) the size of the institution; and (2) the
span of control. Larger institutions will tend to have more managers (as
a portion of total employment) than smaller institutions. This is because
these larger institutions have more hierarchical ranks than their smaller
counterparts. Institutions with a smaller span of control will also tend to
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have more managers, as the corresponding hierarchy is ‘steeper’.
The management share of employment (M/N) within a hierarchy is
given by Eq. 20, where n is the number of hierarchical ranks and s is the
span of control:
M
N
=
1− sn−2
1− sn (6)
Because this equation is non-linear, the management share of employ-
ment grows rapidly as the first few hierarchical ranks are added. But as
more ranks are added, the relative number of managers plateaus at 1/s2.
Note that Eq. 6 gives the management share of employment within
a single hierarchy. We are interested, however, in the management share
of employment across all hierarchies. The equation for this global av-
erage depends on the size-distribution of hierarchies. In the model used
here, I do not derive a general formula for this global average, but instead
calculate it numerically.
4.3 Modeling government
To model the size of government, I take inspiration from a biological
phenomenon: the biomass spectrum [80]. Across the entire range of life
(from bacteria to large mammals) the abundance of organisms declines
predictably with mass [81]. Small organisms are ubiquitous. Large or-
ganisms are rare.
To model government size, I take inspiration from this regularity
amidst difference. Elephants are different than bacteria, yet their abun-
dance is still predictable from their size. Might the same be true of gov-
ernment? Governments are obviously different than other institutions.
Governments can tax their citizens, enforce laws and wage war — all
things that firms cannot do. But what if, despite these differences, gov-
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ernments fit into the overall size distribution of institutions? What if
governments behave as if they were the largest ‘firms’. If so, then the
employment share of government could be predicted from the size distri-
bution of institutions.
As a first approximation, I model governments as the n largest insti-
tutions. Here n is a free parameter that varies between model iterations.
To simulate the size distribution of institutions, I draw one million obser-
vations from a power-law distribution. Of these observations, the largest
n are defined as ‘governments’. The rest are defined as ‘firms’.
4.4 Model predictions
The hierarchy model predicts how both government size and the relative
number of managers should change with energy use. In Figures 8 and 9,
I compare these predictions to real-world trends.
Let us begin with the growth of government (Fig. 8). The model pre-
dicts that governments should tend to grow larger as energy use increases.
There is, however, significant leeway for this trend to be pushed ‘up’ (to
larger government) or ‘down’ (to smaller government). In the model, this
leeway stems from the number of ‘firms’ in government. Here govern-
ments are modeled as the n largest institutions (firms), where n is a free
parameter. Increasing the number of firms in government increases the
size of government at the given level of energy use.
I interpret the number of ‘firms’ in government as a political prefer-
ence. Societies with leftist politics tend to let government do what would,
in right-wing societies, be done by private firms. In the model, this left-
ward shift in politics corresponds to adding ‘firms’ to government. For
instance, a healthcare ‘firm’ in a right-wing society becomes a health-
care branch of government in a left-wing society. So moving left on the
political spectrum involves adding ‘firms’ to government. Moving right
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Figure 8: The modeled growth of government with energy use
This figure compares empirical trends to the modeled relation between gov-
ernment share of employment and energy use per person. Each colored dot
represents a model iteration. Color indicates the number of ‘firms’ in modeled
government (the model’s sole parameter). Real-world data is plotted over top
of the model as black points. Select countries are labeled with alpha-3 codes.
The inset panel shows the smoothed trends for the empirical data and the best-fit
model.
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involves taking ‘firms’ away from government.
Given this interpretation, the model suggests that politics strongly
affect the size of government. But the model also suggests that there is
a larger trend that has little to do with politics. Governments tend to get
larger as energy use increases. In our model, this stems from a change
in the entire size distribution of institutions, of which governments are
a part. Governments, the model suggests, are riding a larger wave of
institutional change.
The inset panel in Figure 8 shows how the best-fit model compares
to the smoothed trend in real-world data. (For fitting methods, see Sec.
8.) In this model, government consists of the 87 largest institutions. The
model closely predicts the growth of government during initial stages of
development. For large energy use, however, the model diverges from the
real-world trend. This may be because the model is wrong. Alternatively,
political preferences (for government) may change with energy use. I
leave it for future research to better understand this discrepancy.
Switching now to the growth managers, Figure 9 compares model
predictions to real-world trends in energy use and the management share
of employment. Here color shows the span of control of the modeled hi-
erarchies. A smaller span of control produces a ‘steeper’ hierarchy, which
leads to more managers at a given level of energy use. A larger span of
control produces ‘flatter’ hierarchies, which leads to fewer managers at
a given level of energy use. Virtually all of the empirical data can be fit
with a span of control between 2 and 7 — a range that is consistent with
the span of control observed in real-world hierarchies (see Fig. 13 in Sec.
8).
The model predicts that the management share of employment should
grow rapidly during initial stages of development. As energy use contin-
ues to increase, however, the management share of employment plateaus.
This, our model suggests, is a characteristic effect of hierarchy. In the
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Figure 9: The modeled growth of management with energy use
This figure compares empirical trends to the modeled relation between the man-
agement share of employment and energy use per person. Color indicates ‘span
of control’ — the number of subordinates controlled by each superior (the
model’s sole parameter). Real-world data is plotted over top of the model as
black points. Select countries are labeled with alpha-3 codes. The inset panel
shows the smoothed trends for the empirical data and the best-fit model.
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limit that the entire population is organized in a single hierarchy, the
management share of employment will be 1/s2, where s is the span of
control.
The inset panel in Figure 9 compares the best-fit model (which has
a span of control of 3.5) to the smoothed trend in real-world data. (For
fitting methods, see Sec. 8.) The fit is quite close, departing only at
extremes of energy use, where the empirical sample size is small.
5 Inferring the growth of hierarchy
The model suggests that the growth with energy use of both government
and managers is consistent with the general growth of hierarchy. Assum-
ing that the model is correct, we can use it to infer how hierarchy changes
with energy use. To do this, I find the model iteration that best fits a given
empirical observation. I then measure the ‘degree of hierarchy’ in the
model and infer that this is what exists in the real-world society. (Since
this inference is model dependent, we should treat it with appropriate un-
certainty.) Once all real-world observations have been fitted, I infer the
trend in hierarchy.
5.1 Measuring the degree of hierarchy
A hierarchy is a type of network in which connections have a tree-like
structure. Most real-world networks have a complicated structure that is
neither purely hierarchical nor purely non-hierarchical. To measure this
structure, network scientists have proposed several ways of quantifying
the ‘degree of hierarchy’ in a network. By treating society as a network
of relations, we can apply these measures to humans.
I use two different measures to quantify the degree of hierarchy in
the model: (1) ‘global reaching centrality’; and (2) the concentration of
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Figure 10: Subordinates in a hierarchy
‘hierarchical power’.
Global reaching centrality has been proposed as universal measure of
the degree of hierarchy in a network [82,83]. It is based on the concept of
a ‘directed network’ — a network in which connections between nodes
have a direction. In terms of hierarchy, we can think of this connection
as a form of control. If person A controls person B, the network connec-
tion is directed from A to B. (This direction can also have a weighting
that signifies the strength of control. Here I assume that all relations are
100% directed.) The ‘local reaching centrality’ of person A is the portion
of people that can be reached by following the directed network. In a
hierarchy this corresponds to counting subordinates. The local reaching
centrality CR of person i:
CR(i) =
Ns(i)
N−1 (7)
Here Ns(i) is the number of subordinates below person i, and N is the
total number of people in the network. Figure 10 shows an example. The
red individual has 6 subordinates within a hierarchy of 31 people, giving
a local reaching centrality of 6/31 = 0.19.
The ‘global reaching centrality’ of the network is defined as the sum
of the differences between the local reaching centrality of each person
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and the maximum reaching centrality, CmaxR :
GRC =
∑ni=1 [CmaxR −CR(i) ]
N−1 (8)
Global reaching centrality can range between 0 to 1. A value of 0 indi-
cates no hierarchy. A value of 1 indicates a ‘perfect hierarchy’, in which a
single individual controls the rest of the population. The global reaching
centrality of the hierarchy in Figure 10 is 0.92.
A distinguishing feature of global reaching centrality is that ‘flat’ hi-
erarchies (with a large span of control) are considered the most hierar-
chical. Whether this is so is a question of definition. Within human
hierarchies at least, we usually consider ‘steep’ hierarchies to be more
hierarchical than ‘flat’ hierarchies. Because of this belief, I propose a
second measure of the degree of hierarchy — one that equates steeper
hierarchies with ‘more’ hierarchy.
Like global reaching centrality (when it is applied to human hierar-
chies), this measure focuses on control over subordinates. For ease of
reference, I give this control a name — I call it ‘hierarchical power’. The
idea is that control over subordinates is a form of power — it increases
“the possibility of imposing one’s will upon the behavior of other per-
sons” [84]. In a hierarchy, the hierarchical power P of person i is:
P(i) = ns(i)+1 (9)
Here ns(i) is the number of subordinates controlled by person i. The
reasoning here is that all individuals start with a baseline power of 1, in-
dicating they have control over themselves. Hierarchical power then in-
creases proportionally with the number of subordinates. As an example,
the red individual in Figure 10 has a hierarchical power of 7 (6 subordi-
nates + 1). To quantify the ‘degree of hierarchy’ in a society, I measure
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the concentration of hierarchical power using the Gini index. This value
can range from 0 (no hierarchy) to 1 (maximum hierarchy).
5.2 Assumptions
To calculate the degree of hierarchy in the model, I assume that there
are no directed relations between institutions. This means that hierarchi-
cal relations are confined within institutions. In the real world, power
relations between institutions do exist via the interlocking network of
ownership [85, 86]. But I exclude this complexity here. I also exclude
any variation in the strength of power relations, meaning all relations are
fully directed.
Lastly, the model does not directly simulate the chain of command
within hierarchies. Instead, it simulates aggregate hierarchical structure
— the number of people in each rank. To calculate the degree of hierar-
chy, I assign each individual the average number of subordinates below
their rank, defined as:
Ns(h) =
∑h−11 Ni
Nh
(10)
Here h is the hierarchical rank, N is the membership in each rank, and Ns
is the average number of subordinates.
5.3 Fitting the model
I fit the model to the real-world data for management employment and
energy use (Fig. 9). For each country-year observation, I chose the model
Inferring the growth of hierarchy 30
that minimizes the following error function:
ε = [logEr− logEm]2+[logMr− logMm]2 (11)
Here Er and Em are energy use per capita in the real-world observation
and model, respectively. Mr and Mm are the management share of em-
ployment in the real-world observation and model, respectively. Because
the model is stochastic, I choose the 10 best-fit iterations, and average the
measured degree of hierarchy across these models.
5.4 Inferred trends in hierarchy
Figure 11 shows the inferred trend in the ‘degree of hierarchy’. The main
panel shows the concentration of hierarchical power, measured with the
Gini index, plotted against energy use per capita. The inset panel shows
the same trend, but measures the ‘degree of hierarchy’ using global reach-
ing centrality.
The two measures of hierarchy show essentially the same trend. Hu-
man societies, the model suggests, become more hierarchical as energy
use increases. But this growth of hierarchy is not linear. Instead, the
degree of hierarchy appears to grow rapidly during initial stages of de-
velopment, after which it plateaus.
The reasons for this non-linear behavior stem from the assumptions
of the model, coupled with basic features of hierarchy. The model as-
sumes that institutions grow larger with energy use. As institutions grow,
they add new hierarchical ranks, increasing the ‘degree of hierarchy’ in
the society. The non-linear behavior in the ‘degree of hierarchy’ occurs
because new ranks are added in proportion to the logarithm of institution
size (a behavior that has been observed in real-world groups [41,87,88]).
This means that new ranks are added rapidly at first, but the rate slows
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Figure 11: The inferred degree of hierarchy vs. energy use
This figure shows how the inferred degree of hierarchy in human societies
changes with energy use. The main panel shows the inferred concentration of
hierarchical power, measured using the Gini index. Colored lines indicate the
inferred path of countries through time. Select countries are labeled with alpha-3
codes. The black line shows the smoothed trend, calculated with a local polyno-
mial regression. The inset panel shows the same model inferences, but measures
the degree of hierarchy using global reaching centrality.
Rethinking free-market theory 32
as institutions grow larger. Consequently the degree of hierarchy grows
non-linearly with energy use.
6 Rethinking free-market theory
From the model, I infer that societies tend to become more hierarchical
as they develop. What does this mean for our two competing theories —
multilevel selection theory and free-market theory?
Interpreted using multilevel selection theory, the evidence suggests
that humans may use hierarchy as a way to suppress competition within
groups. As the need for coordination grows (with the increasing com-
plexity of economic activity) societies therefore become more hierarchi-
cal. The process is a complex evolutionary one — with larger (hierarchi-
cal) groups beating out smaller (less-hierarchical) groups. How and why
this actually happens is an open question. But the (inferred) fact that it
happens is consistent with multi-level selection theory.
The same evidence, in contrast, is difficult to interpret using the eco-
nomic theory of free markets. According to this theory, small-scale (mar-
ket) competition is the optimal form of social organization. Yet to in-
dustrialize, human societies seem to do the opposite of what the theory
advocates. They turn not to atomistic competition, but instead to large-
scale hierarchical organization. One could argue, of course, that societies
would be better off if they abandoned hierarchy in favor of atomistic com-
petition. But there is little evidence that industrial development could
be achieved this way. So a reasonable interpretation of the evidence is
that free-market theory is incorrect. The complex activities needed for
industrial development cannot be achieved (as the theory claims) using
small-scale competition.
Were we studying (non-human) animals, we could leave it at that.
The evidence favors one theory (multilevel selection) but not the other
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(the economic theory of free markets). The problem, though, is that we
are not studying animals. We are studying humans. And humans have
beliefs that shape our behavior. This means that social-scientific theories
must be evaluated in two separate ways. First, they must be evaluated on
their factual merit. I will call this the ‘scientific’ component of the the-
ory. Second, social-scientific theories must be evaluated in terms of their
effect on human behavior. I will call this the ‘ideological’ component of
the theory.
What is important is that the ideological component of a theory does
not depend on the scientific component. Put simply, a social-scientific
theory can be simultaneously incorrect and ideologically potent. Karl
Marx’s theory of capitalism is a good example [89]. Critics have argued
that Marx’s theory is fundamentally flawed [4,9,11,90]. Yet few scholars
dispute Marx’s impact on history. Without Marx’s ideas, the communist
revolutions of the 20th century may never have occurred.
In the case of Marxist theory, it is straightforward to understand the
ideological component. Marx claimed that the injustices of capitalism
could be solved only by communist revolution [91]. Inspired by Marx’s
ideas, revolutionaries like Lenin and Mao did precisely what Marx pro-
posed — they led communist revolutions to overthrow capitalism.
When it comes to free-market theory, however, the ideological com-
ponent is less easily understood. On the face of it, free-market the-
ory advocates atomistic competition. Yet the theory became popular at
precisely the time when small-scale competition was being replaced by
large-scale hierarchy. Figure 12 shows this trend in the United States.
Here I plot the relative word frequency (in American written English)
of four free-market terms: ‘small business’, ‘free market’, ‘competitive
market’ and ‘perfect competition’. I take this word frequency as a mea-
sure of the prevalence of free-market ideas. Against this word frequency,
I plot our two proxies for hierarchy: the government share of employ-
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ment and the management share of employment. Over the last century,
it seems that free-market jargon became more come common at the very
time that hierarchy grew.
How should we interpret this trend? One possibility is that the spread
of free-market language was a reaction to the growth of hierarchy. See-
ing the growth of government and large firms, free-market proponents
reacted by writing more frequently about the merits of small-scale com-
petition. But despite the increasing prevalence of their ideas, free-market
proponents were unable to stop the growth of government and large firms.
If this interpretation is correct, then free-market ideas do have an atom-
istic effect. It is just that these ideas failed to catch hold.
There is, however, another interpretation that deserves to be explored.
When we separate a theory into a scientific and ideological component,
there is no reason to insist that the two sides be connected. In other
words, the ideological effect of a theory (its effect on human behavior)
can be different from the theory’s factual claims. Free-market theory
argues that small-scale competition is the most effective form of social
organization. But when put into action, perhaps free-market ideas lead to
the opposite of what they claim. Might free-market thinking foster (not
hinder) the growth of hierarchy? The evidence in Figure 12 suggests that
this possibility is worth exploring.
6.1 Belief systems as ‘massive fictions’
According to multilevel selection theory, social animals face a fundamen-
tal dilemma. To be successful, social groups must suppress the selfish
behavior of individuals. The problem is that within the group, selfish be-
havior is advantageous. David Sloan Wilson and E.O. Wilson call this
dilemma the ‘fundamental problem of social life’ [17]. The existence of
sociality is predicated on solving this problem.
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Figure 12: Frequency of free-market terminology in American En-
glish vs. the US government and management share of employment
This figure shows the relative frequency in American English of four free-market
terms. Panel A compares this word frequency to the government share of US
employment. Panel B compares it to the management share of employment. For
sources and methods, see Section 8.
Rethinking free-market theory 36
Humans, it seems, have developed a way to motivate altruism that
is unique. We rely, at least in part, on the power of beliefs. Successful
groups adopt belief systems that motivate group cohesion [92]. Impor-
tantly, these beliefs need not be scientifically true. So long as they moti-
vate altruism, the factual component of the beliefs is irrelevant. For this
reason, David Sloan Wilson argues that belief systems are often ‘mas-
sively fictional’:
Groups governed by belief systems that internalize social
control can be much more successful than groups that must
rely on external forms of social control. For all of these (and
probably other) reasons, we can expect many belief systems
to be massively fictional in their portrayal of the world. [93]
(emphasis added)
To solve the fundamental problem of social life, Wilson argues that
belief systems contain a (possibly universal) untruth. They portray altru-
istic behavior as beneficial to the individual. In so doing, these belief-
systems promote altruism by denying the sacrifice that it necessarily (ac-
cording to multilevel selection theory) involves.
As an example of such a ‘massively fictional’ belief system, Wilson
studies the worldview of the Hutterites (a communal sect of protestants
living in northwestern North America). The Hutterite worldview, Wilson
finds, contains no grey areas [46]. Actions are portrayed either as good
for both individuals and groups, or bad for both individuals and groups.
By masking the costs of altruism, this belief system may be how Hut-
terites motivate communal behavior.
Interestingly, Wilson finds a striking parallel between the communal
beliefs of the Hutterites and the libertarian (i.e. free-market) beliefs of
Ayn Rand [46]. Like the Hutterites, Rand’s worldview seems to have no
grey areas. Actions are portrayed either as good for both individuals and
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the group, or bad for both individuals and the group. There is, however,
an important distinction between the Hutterites’ beliefs and Rand’s liber-
tarianism. The Hutterites portray prosocial behavior (traits like ‘brother-
liness’ and ‘mutual help’) as good for both the individual and the group.
Rand, in contrast, portrays antisocial behavior (traits like ‘egoism’ and
‘selfishness’) as good for both the individual and the group.
Noting this fact, Wilson argues that Rand’s worldview — and free-
market thinking in general — may be detrimental to group cohesion. This
conclusion is reasonable. But it presumes that free-market ideas (which
are avowedly antisocial) lead to antisocial behavior. It is possible, how-
ever, that the reverse might be true. Free-market ideas might actually
promote prosocial behavior by motivating the formation of hierarchy.
6.2 Motivating hierarchy
Although we do not commonly think of them this way, hierarchical rela-
tions involve altruism. In a hierarchical relation, one person submits to
the will of another. By doing so, the subordinate suppresses their own
self-interest, and instead does what their superior commands. This is a
form of altruism. The question that concerns us here is — how do soci-
eties motivate this submissive behavior?
An obvious way is to openly promote it. Societies that take this route
will promote submission as being beneficial to individuals. The Hut-
terites, for instance, seem to do just that. Their belief system promotes
‘obedience’ and ‘surrender’ as good for both individuals and the group
[46]. Other religions similarly promote submission. Obsequium religio-
sum — religious submission — is a central tenet of Catholic dogma [94].
Confucianism advocates tsun-wang — submission to authority [95]. In
Islam, ‘submission’ is implied in the name of the faith itself [96].
To promote hierarchy, however, this appeal to submission must have
Rethinking free-market theory 38
an asymmetry. To function, hierarchies require both submission and
dominance. So behind the appeal to submission, there must be an as-
sumption that not everyone submits. Some people must have the right to
wield authority. In religious hierarchies, the asymmetry is often main-
tained by appealing to the authority of God. Everyone submits to the will
of God, but not equally so. Some people — those with power — claim
to speak for (or derive their authority from) God. This leads to doctrines
like the ‘divine right of kings’ [97]. The pharaohs of ancient Egypt went
so far as to proclaim themselves gods [98].
Using the language of Michele Gelfand [99], we might call the ap-
peal to submission the ‘tight’ approach to motivating hierarchy. It openly
asks individuals to submit to authority. Is there a corresponding ‘loose’
approach to motivating hierarchy? I propose that free-market thinking —
with its emphasis on choice and freedom [100, 101] — may be one such
‘loose’ approach.
This claim appears, at first, to be contradictory. So-called ‘loose’ cul-
tures value freedom and autonomy, which are the opposite of hierarchy. It
is possible, however, for the idea of freedom to lead to its mirror opposite.
The reason has to do with the concept of ‘freedom’ itself. In an impor-
tant sense, ‘freedom’ is impossible among social animals. The problem is
that there are two types of freedom that, when applied to all individuals,
are contradictory. First, there is ‘freedom to’, which is about one’s abil-
ity to enact one’s will. Second, there is ‘freedom from’, which is about
one’s ability to avoid the undesirable actions of others. The two types of
freedom contradict one another. Everyone cannot, for instance, be free to
be racist while also being free from racism. One person’s ‘freedom to’
comes at the cost of another person’s ‘freedom from’.
Much like proclaiming that everyone should be submissive, advocat-
ing for ‘market freedom’ for all individuals is a contradiction. This, I
believe, may be how free-market thinking motivates hierarchy. When ap-
plied to the real world, the ‘freedom’ of the free market is marked by an
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asymmetry. In abstract form, free-market theory stands for the autonomy
of individuals. But in more concrete form, the theory stands for the au-
tonomy of firms. This switch is apparent in neoclassical economic theory.
The theory proposes that ‘perfect competition’ (implying atomistic com-
petition between individuals) is the ideal form of social organization. But
the same theory accepts that firms — which do not use the free market
within their bounds — are the basic unit of production [102].
This switch from autonomy of the individual to the autonomy of the
group, I propose, is how free-market ideas promote hierarchy. It is eas-
iest to see how this might work by applying the idea to ourselves. We
use the word ‘free will’ to describe our own freedom to put conscious
thoughts into action. Yet when we look inside ourselves, the concept of
‘free will’ is contradictory. Individual humans are a community of coop-
erating cells, organized in a hierarchy. This means that our ‘free will’ is
predicated on a large number of cells being ‘unfree’. If you are free to lift
your arm at will, this requires that brain cells have control over muscle
cells. So the ‘free will’ of the individual is predicated on the ‘unfreedom’
of most of the individual’s constituents.
I propose that the same principle applies when free-market ideas are
put in action. While, in principle, they stand for the autonomy of the in-
dividual, in practice they stand for the autonomy of business firms. By
promoting this autonomy, these ideas may implicitly legitimize the hier-
archy within firms. The ‘freedom’ of the free market therefore translates
into the power of firm owners to command. It is ‘power in the name
of freedom’1. This doublespeak may be why free-market thinking has
spread at the very time that hierarchy appears to have increased. Con-
trary to the theory’s scientific claim, the ideological effect of free-market
thinking may be to facilitate the growth of hierarchy.
This idea is speculative, but could be tested. One way would be to see
how various measures of cultural ‘tightness’ and ‘looseness’ relate to the
measures of hierarchy adopted here (specifically, the management share
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of employment, which appears uncorrelated with political regimes). If
the reasoning above is correct, then ‘loose’ cultures may (paradoxically)
be more hierarchical than ‘tight’ cultures.
7 Conclusions
Peter Brown and Peter Timmerman argue that mainstream economics is
an ‘orphaned discipline’. It is founded, they claim, on a “dated and un-
revised metaphysical and prescientific vision” that is “incompatible with
what we know about the universe and our place in it” [103]. Looking at
free-market theory in the context of the modern understanding of evolu-
tion, this assessment rings true.
Adam Smith’s concept of the invisible hand was a plausible hypothe-
sis when it was proposed more than two centuries ago [1]. Given the state
of knowledge at the time, it seemed possible that self-interest, if properly
channeled, could benefit groups. But as our knowledge of evolution has
progressed, this hypothesis has grown steadily less plausible. The prob-
lem is that the major transitions in evolution show a pattern that is the
opposite of the invisible hand. Rather than organize decentrally, each
wave of group formation seems to use at least some form of centraliza-
tion. And rather than stoke the self-interest of subcomponents, successful
groups seem to suppress it. And they often do so by using hierarchy.
Whether it is the symbiosis of the eukaryotic cell, the coordination in
multicellular organisms, or the cooperation among eusocial animals, this
pattern seems to hold. Competition among subcomponents is suppressed
using some form of centralized organization. And yet, if the economic
theory of free markets is correct, humans are the exception to the rule. We
can organize, the theory claims, not by suppressing competition within
groups, but by stoking it.
This claim becomes even more important if we consider that modern
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humans may be the most recent major evolutionary transition. In the
last 10,000 years we have transitioned from being a social species that
lived in groups of several hundred [104–106], to an ‘ultrasocial’ species
living in groups a million strong [29–32]. If we have accomplished this
feat through decentralized competition (as free-market theory claims is
possible), then the evidence should surround us. And since this transition
has accelerated in the last half century [107,108], we need not look to the
deep past to study it. We can look at modern trends between nations.
Looking at these trends, the evidence suggests that human societies
have developed in a way that is consistent with the major evolutionary
transitions of the past. As societies industrialize (evident by growing
energy use), it seems they turn not to decentralized competition, but to
increasingly large-scale hierarchy.
Where, then, does this leave the economic theory of free markets?
A conservative conclusion is that free-market theory is inconsistent with
the evidence. A more radical conclusion is that free-market theory is
best treated not as a scientific theory, but as a belief system — a claim
that heterodox political economists have made many times [9, 109–117].
If this more radical interpretation is true, then we must grapple with a
paradox. Free-market theory advocates for the autonomy of individuals.
Yet the spread of free-market thinking has happened at the very time that
hierarchy seems to have increased. One possible explanation is that free-
market ideas, when implemented, actually promote centralization. This
idea is speculative, but is worth investigating.
Regardless of the behavioral effects of free-market ideas, the evi-
dence reviewed here suggests that societies do not use atomistic com-
petition to develop. Given this finding, it may be time for evolutionary-
minded scientists to stop treating neoclassical economics as a competing
framework, and instead view it as a cultural artifact to be explained.
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8 Sources and methods
All data and code for this paper are available at the Open Science Frame-
work: https://osf.io/gbvnh/. Code for the hierarchy model is available at
github: https://github.com/blairfix/energy hierarchy mod. R versions of
the hierarchy-model functions are available at https://github.com/blairfix/
hmod.
8.1 Data sources
Communist/non-communist status. I classify a country as ‘commu-
nist’ if it has, or once had, a regime that claimed to be Marxist–Leninist.
See the supplementary materials for a detailed list of sources.
Energy use per capita. Data for energy use per capita comes from
the World Bank, series EG.USE.PCAP.KG.OE. To these values I add an
estimate for energy consumed through food (2000 kcal per day).
Government employment. Data for government employment comes
from ILOSTAT series GOV LVL PSE (all public sector employees). I
divide this series by the size of the labor force reported in World Bank se-
ries SL.TLF.TOTL.IN. Data for US government employment share (Fig.
12A) comes from:
• 1890 to 1928: Historical Statistics of the United States, Table Ba
470-477
• 1929 to present: Bureau of Economic Analysis series 6.8A-D (total
persons engaged in production)
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Managers’ employment. International management share of employ-
ment data is from ILOSTAT Table TEM OCU, series EMPoc1P. Man-
agement employment share for the US (Fig. 12B) comes from:
• 1860 to 1990: Historical Statistics of the United States, Table Ba
1033-1046
• 1990 to present: Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Population
Survey series LNU02032453 (management employment) divided
by Bureau of Economic Analysis series 6.8D (total persons en-
gaged in production)
Firm size. Data for firm size comes from the Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor (GEM), series ‘omnowjob’. To calculate firm size, I merge all
data over the years 2001-2014. Because the GEM data over-represents
large firms, I use only firms with 1000 or fewer employees. For method
details, see the Appendix in [72]. Power-law exponents for firm-size dis-
tributions are estimated using the R PoweRlaw package [119].
Free-market word frequency. Word frequency of free-market jargon
is from the Google Ngram corpus for American English.
8.2 Hierarchy-model equations
The hierarchy model used in this paper is based on equations derived
independently by Herbert Simon [77] and Harold Lydall [78]. In this
model, hierarchies have a constant span of control. We assume that there
is one person in the top rank. The total membership in the hierarchy is
then given by the following geometric series:
NT = 1+ s+ s2+ ...+ sn−1 (12)
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Here n is the number of ranks, s is the span of control, and NT is the total
membership. Summing this geometric series gives:
NT =
1− sn
1− s (13)
In my model of hierarchy, the input is the hierarchy size NT and the
span of control s. To model the hierarchy, we must first estimate the
number of hierarchical ranks n. To do this, we solve Eq. 13 for n:
n =
⌊
log [1+NT (s−1)]
log(s)
⌋
(14)
Here bc denotes rounding down to the nearest integer. Next we need
to calculate N1 — the employment in the bottom hierarchical rank. To
do this, we first note that the firm’s total membership NT is given by the
following geometric series:
NT = N1
(
1+
1
s
+
1
s2
+ ...+
1
sn−1
)
(15)
Summing this series gives:
NT = N1
(
1−1/sn
1−1/s
)
(16)
Solving for N1 gives:
N1 = NT
(
1−1/s
1−1/sn
)
(17)
Given N1, membership in each hierarchical rank h is:
Nh =
⌊
N1
sh−1
⌋
(18)
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Sometimes rounding errors cause total employment of the modeled
hierarchy to depart slightly from the size of the original inputted institu-
tions. When this happens I add/subtract members from the bottom rank
to correct the error. The model is implemented numerically in C++, using
the Armadillo linear algebra library [120].
8.3 Modeling Managers
I model managers as all individuals in and above rank 3. In a firm with
n hierarchical levels, the number of managers is equivalent to the mem-
bership in a hierarchy with n− 2 levels. Using Eq. 13, we find that the
number of managers M is:
M =
1− sn−2
1− s (19)
By dividing Eq. 19 by Eq. 13, we can find the management share of
employment (M/N) in the firm:
M
N
=
1− sn−2
1− sn (20)
8.4 Finding the best-fit model
To find the model parameters that best fit the trends in empirical data
(inset Fig. 8 and Fig. 9), I first bin model results in log-spaced bins
by energy use. (This smooths the stochastic noise that is built into the
model.) In each bin, I calculate the average energy use and the average
of the statistic of interest (either the management share of employment
or the government share of employment). I then interpolate linearly be-
tween this averaged points, creating a function that relates energy use to
the government/management share of employment. I use this numeric
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function to compute the error between the model and the raw empirical
data. The error function is:
ε = [logSr− logSm]2 (21)
Here Sr is the real-world statistic (either government or management
share of employment) and Sm is the model statistic. The best-fit model
minimizes this error.
8.5 Verifying the span of control
In the management model, the span of control is a free parameter that
varies between model iterations. One way to test the model is see if fit-
ted values for the span of control are consistent with observations from
real-world firms. To do this I fit the model to the energy-management
empirical data using the error function in Eq. 11. The resulting distri-
bution (for all country-year observations) of the fitted span of control is
shown in Figure 13. I compare this distribution to the span of control
distribution reported in case studies of firm hierarchy. The model’s esti-
mated span of control is in a range that is consistent with the real-world
observations. A t-test (p= 0.77) and ks-test (p= 0.08) both indicate that
the two distributions are statistically indistinguishable at the 5% level.
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Figure 13: Span of control — empirical data and model estimates
The red distribution shows density estimates for the span of control in the avail-
able studies of firm hierarchy. Data is from [54–56, 58–64, 67, 68]. I first aver-
age the spans reported by each study, and then plot the distribution of averages.
Since the density estimate comes from a small sample, I also plot the individ-
ual observations as points on the x-axis. The blue distribution shows density
estimates for the span of control fitted by the hierarchy model.
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